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Abstract
Previous research on public support for participatory decision-making fails to distinguish between vote-centric (referen-
dums and initiatives) and talk-centric (deliberative-style meetings) instruments, despite a deliberative turn in democratic
theory suggesting that political discussion among ordinary citizens improves decision-making. In an online factorial survey
experiment conducted among a sample of 960 Americans recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, we compared support
for the use of referendums and public meetings, arguing that attitudes towards these instruments depend on whether
they are used to inform legislators or take binding decisions. Public meetings were rated considerably lower than referen-
dums and initiatives, especially when the outcomes were binding. Contrary to expectations, we did not find a preference
for binding (over advisory) referendums and individuals from referendum and initiative states, where these instruments
are legally binding, expressed less support for binding participatory reforms than individuals from non-direct democratic
states. Despite the many critiques of direct democracy, public debate in the US has not considered whether advisory out-
comes might appease some of these concerns. The results also demonstrated that individuals expressing concerns about
the inability of ordinary citizens to understand politics and about the welfare of minority groups were not as negative
about participatory decision-making when legislators had the final say.
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1. Introduction
Several studies in established democracies document
broad popular support for allowing citizens a greater
role in political decisions (Bengtsson & Mattila, 2009;
Bowler, Donovan, & Karp, 2007; Craig, Kreppel, & Kane,
2001; Dalton, Burklin, & Drummond, 2001; Donovan &
Karp, 2006). Data from cross-national surveys such as the
European Social Survey (Round 6, 2012) and the Interna-
tional Social Survey Program (ISSP ResearchGroup, 2016)
demonstrate that 70–80% of respondents agreewith the
use of referendums for making political decisions. How-
ever, previous research on public support for participa-
tory decision-making fails to distinguish between ‘vote-
centric’ and ‘talk-centric’ instruments—despite a ‘delib-
erative turn’ in democratic theory—and between con-
sultative and legally binding outcomes. These are impor-
tant distinctions because they tell us more about how cit-
izenswant to be involved in political decision-making and
whether they want to be in control of policymaking, or
are satisfied simply being heard.
Participatory reforms or democratic innovations are
‘instruments designed to increase citizen participation
in the political decision-making process’ (Smith, 2009,
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p. 1). Whereas some of these instruments are more
‘vote-centric’ e.g., referendums and initiatives, others
are more ‘talk-centric’ e.g., mini-publics and deliberative
polls (LeDuc, 2015). Normative political theorists have
urged more deliberation to improve decision-making
processes (Chambers, 2012; Fishkin, 1991; Gutmann &
Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1996), however previous re-
search on citizens’ perceptionsmeasures only support for
referendums or for the general idea of ‘giving citizens
more opportunities to participate in political decision-
making’ (Bengtsson & Mattila, 2009; Bowler et al., 2007;
Craig et al., 2001; Dalton et al., 2001; Donovan & Karp,
2006). By means of a factorial survey experiment where
respondents are randomly assigned vignettes about refer-
endums and initiatives or about ‘public meetings where
citizens collectively discuss political issues’, we investi-
gate whether people are more favorable towards vote-
centric or talk-centric decision-making processes.
Public support for these instruments may depend on
howmuch control citizens have over policy outcomes. In
recent years, politicians in New Zealand (Karp & Aimer,
2002), the Netherlands (Qvortrup, 2018), and the UK
(Merrick, 2016) have debated whether the outcomes of
referendums should be respected or subject to parlia-
mentary approval. Talk-centric instruments generally do
not constitute a formal part of the decision-making pro-
cess, although some normative theorists have argued for
‘empowered’ deliberative forums (Fung, 2007; Pateman,
2012; Setälä, 2011). Therefore, with our factorial sur-
vey experiment, we also test whether support for vote-
centric and talk-centric instruments depends onwhether
they are used to inform policymakers or to take bind-
ing decisions.
Finally, we develop several hypotheses about the
skeptics of participatory reforms, testing whether their
attitudes towards these instruments are ‘less negative’
when the outcomes are advisory as opposed to binding.
Critics of referendums and initiatives express concerns
about the inability of ordinary citizens to understand the
issues on the ballot and about the harmful consequences
of majoritarian democracy for minorities (Bowler &
Donovan, 2000; Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Gamble, 1997;
Gerber&Hug, 2001;Haider-Markel, Querze,& Lindaman,
2007; Kang, 2002; Lewis, 2013; Magleby, 1984). Surpris-
ingly, public debate in the US, where binding referen-
dums are commonly used at the state level, has notmore
carefully considered whether advisory outcomes might
alleviate some of these concerns.
The experiment was conducted among a sample of
960 US respondents recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (MTurk). Due to the variation in the use of di-
rect democratic instruments across states, the US pro-
vides a particularly interesting case study. 26 out of 51
states provide for referendums and/or initiatives that
are in most cases legally binding (Cronin, 1999, p. 176).
Nonetheless, Americans remain deeply divided over the
use of direct democratic instruments and their conse-
quences for democracy (Cronin, 1999; Haskell, 2018;
Lewis, 2013). Some institutions such as the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL, 2002) recom-
mend switching to advisory procedures and several
states have flirted with the idea of advisory referendums
in the past (Schaffner, 1907).
2. Theory
2.1. Vote-Centric Instruments
In the 26 American states providing for direct democracy,
referendums and initiatives are generally binding, al-
though some states only allow indirect initiatives where
successful petitions go to the legislature before going
on the ballot (NCSL, 2018). This stands in contrast to
the European experience where referendums are usually
government-initiated and advisory (except Switzerland
and Italy) and where citizens can vote on national issues
(Setälä, 2006). Despite the many criticisms of referen-
dums and initiatives, public debate around the possibility
of advisory measures is lacking in American states. In the
early 20th century, advisory referendums and initiatives
were adopted in some cities but the idea never took off
nationally. Several Congressmen promoted an advisory
referendum on national issues, which received consider-
able public support in a Gallup Survey (Cronin, 1999).
Political scientist David Magleby has advocated
greater use of advisory instruments in the US mainly
because current referendum and initiative (R&I) proce-
dures are too complicated. The process would run more
smoothly if, instead of requiring citizens to propose ac-
tual legislation, legislatures polled citizens about their
general policy preferences (Magleby, 1984, p. 195). Advi-
sory referendums can signal a lack of consensus on an is-
suewhereas a binding initiative is enacted by as slim ama-
jority as 50%. Advisory referendums are also more flexi-
ble because they allow for proposed legislation to be im-
proved or amended after the vote (Cronin, 1999, p. 178).
Studies on the indirect effects of referendums and initia-
tives suggest that proposals can have an impact on poli-
tics even if they donotmake it to a popular vote or are not
approved by a majority of voters (Gerber & Hug, 2001).
Although there is somewhat of a scholarly debate
around the amount of control referendums and initia-
tives have over policy outcomes, the question ofwhether
citizens want to play a decisive role in policymaking
seems to be overlooked. A preference for advisory out-
comes implies that citizens trust legislators to make the
right decisions, provided they have been sufficiently in-
formed, whereas a preference for binding outcomes sug-
gests that citizens desire more opportunities to keep leg-
islators in check (Bowler et al., 2007).
2.2. Talk-Centric Instruments
Vote-centric instruments are more commonly used
than talk-centric instruments, however deliberative
democrats are critical of the unreflective, aggregative,
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and majoritarian qualities of referendums (Chambers,
2001; Setälä, 2011). Deliberative democracy identifies
political discussion among citizens, who must be pre-
pared to defend their views with reasoned argument, as
the key component of political decision-making (Dryzek,
2007). Examples of participatory instruments emphasiz-
ing discussion are citizens’ juries, mini-publics and delib-
erative polls (Pateman, 2012).
Advocates of a discussion-based approach empha-
size a range of positive outcomes: among others, partici-
pants learn important civic skills, consolidate their polit-
ical views, empathize with opposing viewpoints, and set
aside personal interests in the pursuit of common goals
(Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1996; Roberts,
2004). Critics argue that talk-centric instruments make
unrealistic demand on ordinary citizens who lack inter-
est and knowledge of politics (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse,
2002; Mutz, 2006; Warren, 1996). Others express con-
cerns about inequalities in deliberation due to diverging
communication styles and the status effects of sex, race,
culture, and ethnicity (Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 2014;
Sanders, 1997). Nonetheless, there seems to be a grow-
ing consensus among democratic theorists that delibera-
tion enhances democracy (Pateman, 2012).
Talk-centric instruments are very loosely connected
to policymaking and seldom have more than advisory
force (Setälä, 2011). Some deliberative theorists pro-
mote the idea of ‘empowered deliberation’, arguing that
when citizens see a real connection between partici-
pation and outcomes, they are more willing to partici-
pate and take their role seriously (Fung, 2007; Johnson
& Gastil, 2015; Pateman, 2012; Smith, 2009). Others
contend that talk-centric instruments cannot perform a
decision-making function: these instruments are primar-
ily ‘schools of democracy’ where citizens acquire impor-
tant civic skills (Fishkin, 1991); higher stakes privilege
emotions over rational thought and inhibit the potential
for compromise (Mansbridge, 2007); and decisions re-
quire that participants reach a consensus which, accord-
ing to Warren (2017), is neither feasible nor desirable in
deliberative settings.
2.3. Citizens’ Support for Advisory vs. Binding
Talk-Centric and Vote-Centric Instruments
We argue that ordinary citizens do not follow the nor-
mative debate about deliberative democracy and are
therefore not familiar with the reasons why this ap-
proach to political decision-making might produce bet-
ter solutions. Talk-centric instruments are not commonly
used for informing or making political decisions and are
likely to be perceived as chaotic, inefficient, and less
inclusive, especially in comparison to referendums and
initiatives. Therefore, we hypothesize that citizens ex-
press greater support for vote-centric than talk-centric
decision-making instruments (H1).
Public meetings are less inclusive than referendums
because only a small subsection of the public can par-
ticipate, hence the decisions made in these meetings
are likely to be perceived as less representative of what
the general public wants than the decisions made by ref-
erendums (Parkinson, 2003). Deliberations produce out-
comes that are considered legitimate by the body that de-
liberated, but are not necessarily legitimate as binding de-
cisions over a wider democratic polity (Johnson & Gastil,
2015). Therefore, we hypothesize that advisory out-
comes are preferred for talk-centric instruments (H2a).
Voting is the most common deciding rule in contem-
porary democracies and the decisions are perceived as
legitimate by citizens because they correspond to the
views of themajority. The counting of votes revealsmore
about the strength of an opinion (Warren, 2017). Vote-
centric instruments are more inclusive than talk-centric
instruments because every citizen can participate and
they may be perceived as more democratic in the sense
that every vote weighs equally, whereas equality of
voice is difficult to achieve in deliberative settings where
louder or ‘privileged’ voices tend to dominate (Sanders,
1997). Finally, considering claims of widespread dissat-
isfaction with representative institutions, especially in
the US context (Cooper, 2018; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse,
2002), it seems logical to expect that citizens would want
preferences upheld by themajority of the polity to be im-
plemented and not just accounted for. Therefore, we hy-
pothesize that binding outcomes are preferred for vote-
centric instruments (H2b).
2.4. Direct vs. Non-Direct Democratic States
The US offers a particularly interesting case study for this
research because half of the states provide for referen-
dums and initiatives. Surveys conducted in R&I states
demonstrate that citizens tend to regard these instru-
ments in a positive light (Bowler & Donovan, 2002; Craig
et al., 2001; Cronin, 1999). Since South Dakota first
adopted the initiative and referendum in 1898, no state
has ever chosen to do awaywith themand stateswithout
are gradually adopting them at a rate of about one state
per decade since the end of World War II (Matsusaka,
2005, p. 186). Furthermore, studies in the US (Bowler &
Donovan, 2002) and Switzerland (Stadelmann-Steffen &
Vatter, 2012) have demonstrated that exposure to refer-
endums and initiatives is associated with more positive
attitudes towards government. If these instruments con-
tribute to greater satisfaction with government, then cit-
izens who have access to referendums and initiatives are
probably more positive about them than those who do
not have access. Therefore, the previously hypothesized
preference for vote-centric (over talk-centric) decision-
making instruments is expected to be stronger for individ-
uals living in R&I states than for individuals in non-direct
democratic states (H3).
Finally, given that in the US the decisionsmade in R&I
procedures are usually binding, switching to advisory de-
cisions may be perceived by individuals in R&I states as
a step back for democracy. By contrast, individuals resid-
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ing in non-direct democratic states might consider advi-
sory instruments as a step forwards and therefore not
differentiate as much between advisory and binding out-
comes. We hypothesize that the positive effect of resid-
ing in a R&I state on support for participatory reforms is
weaker when the decisions are advisory as opposed to
binding (H4).
2.5. The Skeptics of Participatory Reforms
Several political scientists have criticized direct democ-
racy on the grounds that citizens lack sufficient knowl-
edge to make political decisions (Bowler & Donovan,
2000; Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Kang, 2002; Magleby,
1984) and that majority rule via referendums and initia-
tives contributes to the suppression of minority rights
(Gamble, 1997; Gerber&Hug, 2001; Haider-Markel et al.,
2007; Lewis, 2013). However, with the exception of
Anderson and Goodyear-Grant (2010), who argue that
these are the reasons why highly informed voters are
skeptical of referendums, no studies have investigated
whether these concerns influence ordinary citizens’ at-
titudes towards participatory reforms.
Pollsters consistently demonstrate that citizens are
not just ignorant about policy issues, but also about the
basic structure of government and how it operates, for
example a recent poll by the Annenberg Policy Centre
found that only 36% of Americans could name the three
branches of federal government (Somin, 2014). Majori-
ties of voters in Arizona, California, Colorado, Oregon,
and Washington agree that initiative and referendum
measures are too complicated to understand (Cronin,
1999; Kang, 2002). Magleby’s (1994) examination of vot-
ing materials from four states found that they required
the reading level of a third-year college student. Stud-
ies demonstrate that citizens often cast votes supporting
the opposite outcome from what they actually intended
(Dubois & Feeney, 1998).
A second critique of direct democratic instruments is
that they can provide a tool for majority action against
unpopular minorities, as demonstrated by the Swiss and
American experience with referendums and initiatives
(Dalton et al., 2001, p. 151). Examples of anti-minority
measures in the US include initiatives banning same-sex
marriage, revoking affirmative action programs, and es-
tablishing the preferential treatment of persons from
specific racial or ethnic backgrounds for employment or
housing (Gamble, 1997). In recent years, initiatives re-
pealing anti-discrimination laws for LGBT persons were
submitted in several states, including California’s infa-
mous Proposition 8 attempting to reverse the high-
court’s ruling in favor of same-sex marriage. In a Gallup
Survey Poll, 32% of Americans agreed that ‘if people
were allowed to vote directly on important issues at the
state and local levels, minority groups in the population
would not get a fair say’ (Cronin, 1999, p. 99).
These concerns about participatory decision-making
could be mitigated if the instruments were restricted to
informing decisions and legislators were allowed more
discretion. For example, legislators would be able to crit-
ically examine proposals that received only limited me-
dia coverage, as this would imply limited public debate
and public knowledge of the issue at hand, or proposals
that infringe on civil rights and liberties. Therefore,wehy-
pothesize that the negative effect of concerns about pub-
lic incompetence on support for participatory decision-
making is weaker when the outcomes are advisory as
opposed to binding (H5) and the negative effect of con-
cerns about minority rights on support for participatory
decision-making is weaker when the outcomes are ad-
visory as opposed to binding (H6). However, concerns
about minority rights may apply more to vote-centric
instruments than talk-centric instruments. Referendums
contribute to fears of a ‘tyrannicalmajority’ because they
promote an aggregative form of democracy where out-
comes are determined by a contest of numbers (Setälä,
2011). Deliberations, on the other hand, encourage par-
ticipants to consider a range of alternatives and perspec-
tives (Warren, 2017). Therefore, we hypothesize that the
negative effect of concern for minority rights on support
for participatory decision-making is weaker (or absent)
when the instrument is talk-centric as opposed to vote-
centric (H7).
3. Data and Methods
3.1. Sample
The survey was programmed and administered on
Qualtrics between December 2016 and February 2017.
Respondents were recruited on MTurk, an online crowd-
sourcing website where people complete tasks in
exchange for a small compensation (usually around
1–2 USD for surveys). In order to prevent ballot-box stuff-
ing, the survey was programmed so that each respon-
dent received a unique completion code that could only
be entered once. 985 people participated in the survey,
25 of which did not complete the survey and were ex-
cluded from the final sample (N = 960). On average, re-
spondents took 7.10minutes to complete the survey and
only 34 respondents took less than 3 minutes. Analyses
with andwithout these 34 respondents yielded the same
results and only very small differences in effect sizes,
therefore we decided to keep them in the final sample.
Mturk is an increasingly popular recruitment tool
among social scientists, however respondents from this
platform are often younger, higher educated, and more
liberal than the general population (Berinsky, Huber, &
Lenz, 2012). In order to obtain a sample that was more
similar to the general population in terms of age, edu-
cation, and political ideology we made use of MTurk’s
‘premium qualifications’. This function enabled us to tar-
get and over-recruit respondents who were older, lower
educated, and conservative. In the final sample, some
groups are slightly under or overrepresented, but the de-
viations from the general population are not large (for
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descriptives comparing the sample to the general popu-
lation see Table 1). As will be explained in the following
section, representative samples are not crucial for facto-
rial survey experiments where the emphasis is on inter-
actions between respondent characteristics and the ex-
perimental manipulations.
Despite these concerns about sampling bias, several
studies have found that respondents recruited onMTurk
are relatively similar to those recruited for nationally
representative surveys. For example, Huff and Tingley
(2015) report similar voting patterns among respondents
from an MTurk sample and the Cooperative Congres-
sional Election Survey, concluding that ‘MTurk could be
an excellent means for exploring how experimental ma-
nipulations influence voting tendencies’ (p. 4).Weinberg,
Freese and McElhattan (2014) compare the results of
an online factorial survey for a sample recruited from a
population-based Internet panel and a sample recruited
onMTurk, demonstrating that the results are similar and
the data quality is higher for the MTurk sample.
3.2. Factorial Survey Experiment
Factorial survey experiments are commonly used in so-
ciology, but less frequently used in research on politi-
cal attitudes and behaviors (Wallander, 2009). Notable
exceptions are Jasso and Opp (1997) and Neblo, Es-
terling, Kennedy, Lazer and Sokhey (2010). In a facto-
rial survey experiment respondents rate hypothetical de-
scriptions of a person or situation, commonly referred
to as ‘vignettes’. The vignettes include several theoret-
ically relevant factors (or attributes) consisting of two
or more values or ‘levels’, which are randomly allocated
to respondents.
Factorial survey experiments combine the advan-
tages of a survey with the advantages of an experi-
ment. Whereas most standard survey research is corre-
lational, these experiments allow for causal inference
about the effects of the vignette factors (Auspurg & Hinz,
2015, p. 11). We can investigate with greater certainty
how the different attributes of a situation influence re-
spondents’ evaluations of the situation (Auspurg & Hinz,
2015;Wallander, 2009). Incorporating the experiment in
a survey with a large sample makes it possible to investi-
gate whether the effects of the vignette factors differ for
different respondents. Therefore, when testing interac-
tions between the experimental factors and respondent
characteristics, having sufficient variation in the respon-
dent characteristics within the sample is more important
than having a representative sample (Auspurg & Hinz,
2015, p. 61).
In our factorial survey experiment, respondents eval-
uated vignettes describing a situation where citizens are
given more opportunities to influence political decisions.
The vignettes were composed of five factors, each of
which has two levels: 1) administrative scale; 2) instru-
ment of decision-making (vote-centric vs. talk-centric);
3) topic of discussion; 4) source of information; and
5) outcome (advisory vs. binding). For this study, only the
effects of the instrument and outcome factors were ana-
lyzed. The factors in the story are not correlated because
the levels were randomly distributed, therefore it is not
necessary to control for the other three factors in the
story. Indeed,we found thatwhen the other factorswere
included in the models our results were not affected. Be-
low is the vignette text with all possible factor levels (the
factors that are analyzed in this study are italicized):
Imagine that citizens in your [town or city/state] were
given more opportunities to influence political deci-
sions by [voting directly on issues in referenda and
initiatives/participating in public meetings where ran-
domly selected citizens are invited to discuss issues
and collectively make decisions]. The citizens will be
able to make decisions on all kinds of topics [includ-
ing sensitive topics/except for sensitive topics], such
as civil rights. To ensure that the citizens make well
informed decisions [an independent commission of
experts will provide information on each issue/each
political party is responsible for communicating its
position on the issue to the public]. Any decision
the citizens make will be [advisory, meaning the lo-
cal/state government can choose whether to carry
it out/binding, meaning the local/state government
must carry it out].
The variation of these levels produces a total of 25 = 32
possible combinations, or experimental conditions. In
order to increase the number of ratings per vignette,
but also because we wanted respondents to compare
vignettes, each respondent was randomly assigned two
vignettes. Each of the 32 experimental conditions was
rated by an average of 60 respondents (range: 54–66).
The two vignettes were presented in random order on
the same screen to facilitate comparison.
In order to account for the nested structure of the
data, i.e. vignettes clustered in respondents, the data
were analyzed with multilevel modeling techniques, as
is recommended for factorial survey designs (Auspurg &
Hinz, 2015; Hox, Kreft, & Hermkens, 1991). The state was
not included as a third level because an empty three-
level model revealed that approximately 0% of the vari-
ation in support for participatory reforms was at the
state level (including the state level also did not affect
the results). To test our hypotheses about the difference
in the effect of advisory vs. binding decisions on sup-
port for vote-centric and talk-centric instruments (H2a
and H2b), we included an interaction between the out-
come and instrument factors. To test our hypotheses
about how the vignette factors and respondent charac-
teristics interact (H3–H7) we included cross-level inter-
actions between the respondent-level variables and the
vignette-level variables (the factors). All analyses were
done in Stata13.
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3.3. Variables
3.3.1. Dependent Variable
Support for participatory reforms is measured by asking
respondents, after each vignette, ‘do you think this is a
good or bad way of making political decisions?’ (0 = very
bad/10 = very good).
3.3.2. Vignette Factors
The ‘instrument’ factor represents whether the mode of
decision-making is talk-centric i.e. a public meeting (= 1)
or vote-centric i.e. referendums and initiatives (= 0). The
‘outcome’ factor represents whether the decisions made
by citizens are advisory (= 1) or binding (= 0).
3.3.3. Respondent Characteristics
Residing in a R&I State. Respondents indicated which
state they currently reside in. All 51 states (as well as
Puerto Rico) are represented in the sample with an av-
erage of 13 respondents per state, although California,
Florida, Pennsylvania, and Texas are overrepresented.
The states were recoded into a dummy variable where
‘0’ means referendums and initiatives are not provided
for by the state constitution and ‘1’ means referendums
and/or initiatives are provided for by the state constitu-
tion. Approximately half of the sample resides in a ref-
erendum or initiative state. Information about the avail-
ability of direct democratic instruments across stateswas
obtained from the website of the NCSL (2018).
Skeptics. Concern for public incompetence is mea-
sured with a reverse code of the statement: ‘most peo-
ple have enough sense to tell whether the government
is doing a good job’ (0 = strongly disagree/4 = strongly
agree). Concern for minority rights is measured with a
reverse code of the statement: ‘in a democratic society,
letting the majority decide is more important than pro-
tecting the rights of minorities’ (0 = strongly disagree/
4 = strongly agree).
Control variables. Age, sex (0 = male, 1 = female),
political interest, and education were included as con-
trol variables as theymight confound the relationship be-
tween the respondent characteristics described above
and support for participatory reforms. For political in-
terest respondents were asked ‘how interested are
you personally in politics?’ (0 = not at all interested/
4 = very interested). Education is a categorical variable
representing the respondent’s highest level of educa-
tion (0 = middle or high school; 1 = vocational degree
or some college experience; 3 = college graduate). Sev-
eral studies have found that education is negatively cor-
related with referendum support (Bengtsson & Mattila,
2009; Collingwood, 2012; Donovan & Karp, 2006) and
Anderson and Goodyear-Grant (2010) argue that highly
informed voters express concern for public incompe-
tence and minority rights.
For descriptives of the variables see Table 1.
4. Results
The overall mean support for participatory reforms is
5.89 on a scale from 0 to 10 (see Table 1), which is not
overwhelming but still above the midpoint (5). The de-
scriptive results in Table 2 demonstrate that respondents
evaluate vote-centric instruments more favorably than
talk-centric instruments. Advisory outcomes seem to be
preferred but especially for talk-centric instruments; the
difference in support for binding vs. advisory referen-
dums is quite small.
The main effects of the factors and respondent char-
acteristics are presented in Table 3, Model 1. The in-
teractions for H2–H7 are included separately in Mod-
els 2–7. All Models are based on the total sample of vi-
gnettes (N = 1,920 or 2 experimental conditions per re-
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (N = 960).
Variables Min Max Mean SD %
Dependent variable
Support for Participatory Reforms 0 10 5.89 2.88
Independent Variables
Residing in Referendum & Initiative State 0 1 0.50 0.50
Concern for Public Incompetence 0 4 1.86 1.08
Concern for Minority Rights 0 4 2.33 1.13
Controls
Female 0 1 0.51 0.50
Age 20 81 42.91 13.88
Political Interest 0 4 3.04 0.80
Education 0 2 1.03 0.85
—Middle to High School 34.58
—Vocational or Associate’s Degree 27.81
—College Graduate 37.60
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Table 2.Mean support for participatory reforms by instrument and outcome.
Vote-Centric (R&I) Talk-Centric (Public Meetings)
Advisory 6.31 5.76
Binding 6.24 5.19
spondent). Starting with the main effects presented in
Model 1, talk-centric instruments receive considerably
less support than vote-centric instruments (almost a full
point on an 11-point scale), confirming H1. Advisory de-
cisions lead to more support for participatory reforms
than binding decisions, although the effect is not very
large (0.31 on an 11-point scale). Given that each respon-
dent rated two vignettes, we checkedwhether these two
vignette factors had similar effects within and between
respondents, which was indeed the case. Taking the in-
strument factor as an example this means, simply said,
that respondents whowere assigned two public meeting
vignettes gave a lower average rating than respondents
who were assigned two referendum vignettes (between-
person effect), but also that respondents who got one
public meeting vignette and one referendum vignette,
on average rated the public meeting vignette lower than
the referendumone (within-person effect). This strength-
ens our findings on the effects of the vignette factors.
Model 1 also demonstrates that individuals residing
in R&I states do not differ in support for participatory
reforms from those residing in non-direct democratic
states. An empty model in which the state-level was in-
cluded as a third level showed no variation in the depen-
dent variable at the state level, making it unlikely that
we would find amain effect of state characteristics. How-
ever, it could still be that living in a R&I state interacts
with the vignette factors,whichwe test inModels 3 and 4.
Confirming expectations, individuals with less faith in the
political competence of the general public and individu-
als expressing concern for minority rights are less favor-
able towards participatory reforms, which was the case
even when controlling for education. The three educa-
tion groups hardly differ in their mean scores on public
incompetence and minority rights, which suggests that
these concerns are not unique to higher educated indi-
viduals. Turning to the controls: women express greater
support than men; age and political interest do not have
an effect; college graduates express less support for par-
ticipatory reforms than non-graduates.
In Model 2 we added the interaction between the
outcome factor and the instrument factor. The main ef-
fect of advisory vs. binding (which in this model is the
effect in the condition public meeting = 0, or the effect
on support for vote-centric instruments) is not significant
demonstrating, contrary to H2b, that people do not have
a preference for advisory vs. binding decisions when the
instrument of decision-making is vote-centric. The main
effect of public meeting (which is the effect in the condi-
tion advisory = 0) shows that binding meetings are eval-
uated less favorably than binding referendums. The in-
teraction coefficient is positive and borderline significant
(p = 0.88), suggesting that the negative effect of public
meetings on support is weaker when the outcomes are
advisory. This provides some support for our expectation
that talk-centric instruments are evaluated more favor-
ablywhen they play an advisory role (H2a).More straight-
forward evidence for this hypothesis is provided by an
additional regression analysis of the public meeting vi-
gnettes only, i.e. on half of the sample of vignettes: in this
model the advisory factor has a positive effect (B= 0.599,
p = 0.001) on support for talk-centric instruments (see
Appendix Table 2).
The interaction between the instrument factor and
residing in a R&I state was included in Model 3. This in-
teraction is not significant, demonstrating that the pref-
erence for vote-centric instruments over talk-centric in-
struments does not depend on whether one lives in a
R&I state or not. Hence, we did not find support for
our expectation that the preference for vote-centric in-
struments would be stronger among individuals in R&I
states (H3).
In Model 4 we added the interaction between resid-
ing in a R&I state and the outcome factor to test our hy-
pothesis that the positive effect of residing in a R&I state
on support for participatory reforms is weaker when the
decisions are advisory as opposed to binding (H4). We
did not find an overall positive effect of residing in a R&I
state (see Model 1) and the main effect of R&I states in
Model 4 (now representing the effect of R&I states in the
condition advisory = 0) shows that individuals from R&I
states are less positive about participatory reforms with
binding outcomes than individuals in non-direct demo-
cratic states. The interaction coefficient is positive and
borderline significant (p = 0.061), suggesting that the
negative effect of living in a R&I state disappears when
the outcomes are advisory.
The interaction between concerns about public in-
competence and the outcome factor was included in
Model 5. The significant interaction effect demonstrates,
consistent with H5, that individuals expressing concerns
about the average citizens’ inability to understand pol-
itics are not as negative about participatory reforms
when the outcomes are advisory as opposed to binding.
In fact, the negative effect of public incompetence con-
cerns disappears when the decisions are advisory, sug-
gesting that this is no longer a concernwhen citizens play
a consultative role.
In Model 6 we added the interaction between con-
cern for minorities and the outcome factor. The signifi-
cant interaction effect demonstrates, consistent with H6,
that individuals expressing concern for minority rights
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Table 3.Multilevel regression estimates of support for participatory reforms (N = 1920 vignettes nested in 960 respondents).
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Vignette Characteristics b(se) b(se) b(se) b(se) b(se) b(se) b(se)
Advisory = 1 (Binding = 0) 0.306(0.12)* 0.100(0.17) 0.305(0.12)* 0.074(0.18) 0.306(0.12)* 0.306(0.12)* 0.306(0.12)*
Public Meeting = 1 (R&I = 0) −0.912(0.13)*** −1.127(0.18)*** −0.874(0.18)*** −0.902(0.13)*** −0.905(0.13)*** −0.912(0.13)*** −0.912(0.13)***
Respondent Characteristics
Residing in R&I State −0.197(0.14) −0.190(0.14) −0.159(0.19) −0.434(0.19)* −0.204(0.14) −0.189(0.14) −0.196(0.14)
Public Incompetence −0.194(0.07)** −0.193(0.07)** −0.193(0.07)** −0.197(0.07)** −0.424(0.09)*** −0.197(0.07)** −0.194(0.07)**
Minority Rights −0.196(0.06)** −0.196(0.06)** −0.196(0.06)** −0.192(0.06)** −0.202(0.06)** −0.306(0.08)*** −0.217(0.08)**
Controls
Female 0.437(0.15)** 0.440(0.15)** 0.436(0.15)** 0.442(0.15)** 0.443(0.15)** 0.430(0.15)** 0.437(0.15)**
Age 0.004(0.01) 0.004(0.01) 0.004(0.01) 0.003(0.01) 0.004(0.01) 0.004(0.01) 0.004(0.01)
Political Interest 0.006(0.09) 0.006(0.09) 0.006(0.09) 0.006(0.09) −0.007(0.09) 0.009(0.09) 0.004(0.09)
Education
—Middle-High School (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
—Vocational or Associate’s −0.002(0.18) 0.002(0.18) −0.003(0.18) −0.002(0.18) 0.013(0.18) 0.006(0.18) −0.001(0.18)
—College Graduate −0.529(0.17)** −0.529(0.17)** −0.530(0.17)** −0.530(0.17)** −0.497(0.17)** −0.532(0.17)** −0.525(0.17)**
Interactions
Advisory × Public Meeting 0.425(0.25)†
Public Meeting × R&I States −0.077(0.25)
Advisory × R&I States 0.468(0.25)†
Advisory × Public Incompetence 0.456(0.12)***
Advisory ×Minority Rights 0.222(0.11)*
Public Meeting x Minority Rights 0.045(0.11)
Constant 6.071(0.35)*** 6.165(0.36)*** 6.051(0.36)*** 6.207(0.36)*** 6.053(0.35)*** 6.058(0.35)*** 6.072(0.35)***
Random Effects
sd(constant) 1.320(0.10) 1.313(0.10) 1.321(0.10) 1.314(0.10) 1.318(0.10) 1.321(0.10) 1.321(0.10)
sd(residual) 2.476(0.06) 2.476(0.06) 2.475(0.06) 2.476(0.06) 2.464(0.06) 2.472(0.06) 2.475(0.06)
Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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are not as negative about participatory reformswhen the
outcomes are advisory as opposed to binding. In conclu-
sion, our expectation that the critics of participatory re-
forms would be less skeptical if the outcomes were advi-
sory is confirmed for both public incompetence and mi-
nority rights.
Finally, the interaction between the instrument fac-
tor and concern forminority rights is included inModel 7.
The interaction effect is not significant demonstrating
that concern for minorities is associated with lower lev-
els of support for participatory reforms, regardless of
whether the decisions are made in referendums and
initiatives or public meetings. Therefore H7, which pre-
dicted that the negative effect of concern for minori-
ties is weaker (or absent) for talk-centric instruments,
is rejected.
5. Conclusion
Deliberative democrats claim that political discussion
among ordinary citizens improves decision-making
processes and enhances democracy (Dryzek, 2007;
Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Mansbridge, 2007;
Pateman, 2012). Political discussion has an educative
effect, by stimulating participants to develop their argu-
mentation skills, and a reconciling effect, by encouraging
participants to consider opposing viewpoints (Fishkin,
1991; Habermas, 1996). By contrast, decision-making
processes centered on voting mechanisms are perceived
as unreflective and polarizing (Chambers, 2012). On
these grounds, some scholars have suggested incorpo-
rating political discussions into participatory decision-
making and empowering these forums to take binding
decisions (Fung, 2007; Pateman, 2012; Setälä, 2011).
However, the main finding of this study suggests that
such an approach to political decision-making would
not go unquestioned by ordinary citizens. Respondents
are considerably less enthusiastic about talk-centric
decision-making instruments than vote-centric decision-
making instruments: vignettes about public meetings
are rated on average one point lower on a 0–10 scale
than those about referendums and initiatives. Public
meetings are evaluated more favorably when they are
restricted to an advisory role, but even then support
is far from overwhelming (advisory meetings score just
above the midpoint of the scale).
This experimental finding contrasts with standard
survey research demonstrating that citizens score sim-
ilarly on single items about referendums and public
assemblies (Font, Wojcieszak, & Navarro, 2015). The
vignettes encouraged respondents to consider these
decision-making instruments more carefully and there-
fore provide a more fruitful way of disentangling cit-
izens’ attitudes towards participatory decision-making.
This finding also contrasts with a survey experiment by
Neblo et al. (2010, p. 573) demonstrating that a large
majority of Americans (83%) are interested in participat-
ing in a deliberative session with a member of Congress.
Empirical evidence frommini-publics shows that citizens
both welcome and enjoy the opportunity to take part
and to deliberate, and that they take their duties seri-
ously (Pateman, 2012). However, the low level of support
for the use of public meetings in our study suggests that
respondents are not enthusiastic about more active en-
gagement in political decision-making, closer to Hibbing
and Theiss-Morse’s more pessimistic claim that what
most Americans want is a ‘Stealth Democracy’ (2002).
On the other hand, support and participation are not
necessarily the same: citizens may dislike the idea of
using public meetings to inform political decisions, but
still happily participate in a deliberative forum. Future
research should investigate why citizens support talk-
centric decision-making instruments less. Is it because
they do not want to participate in more demanding ac-
tivities or is it because the decisions made by a small se-
lection of citizens are not perceived as legitimate for the
wider democratic polity? The common complaint of po-
litical elites not representing the interests of ordinary cit-
izens makes it difficult to imagine that citizens would ac-
cept the decisions made by an unelected body that can-
not be held accountable.
Ordinary citizens do not follow the normative de-
bate about deliberative democracy, which might explain
why they are less enthusiastic about talk-centric instru-
ments. By informing citizens about the benefits of politi-
cal discussion for political decision-making and by adver-
tising these forums among the general public, delibera-
tive democrats can build support for talk-centric instru-
ments. Based on evidence from 41 deliberative forums,
Michels (2011) demonstrates that participants in delib-
erative forums are considerably more positive about the
process and the outcomes than non-participants. There-
fore, future research could investigate whether partici-
pation improves attitudes towards talk-centric decision-
making, or whether positive attitudes are caused by a
self-selection bias.
Although referendums and initiatives were rated
more favorably than public meetings, respondents did
not have a clear preference for binding referendums over
advisory ones. This is surprising because concerns about
growing dissatisfaction with representative institutions
suggest that citizens desire more mechanisms to con-
trol their representatives (Bowler et al., 2007; Cooper,
2018), but also because binding referendums are a com-
mon feature in many American states. Comparing the
attitudes of citizens with and without access to refer-
endums and initiatives leads to findings that might con-
cern the proponents of direct democracy. First, individu-
als in R&I states are not more enthusiastic about the use
of referendums and initiatives than those in non-direct
democratic states, which suggests that access to these
instruments does not contribute to more participatory
attitudes about political decision-making. Second, con-
trary to expectations, individuals in R&I states (where
these instruments are usually binding) are less positive
about binding outcomes than individuals in non-direct
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democratic states, which may imply some dissatisfaction
with the role these instruments currently play in political
decision-making.
Finally, the results demonstrate that concerns about
public incompetence and minority rights are two poten-
tial reasons why some citizens are skeptical of participa-
tory decision-making. However, individuals who express
these concerns are found to be more favorable towards
participatory reforms when outcomes are advisory, giv-
ing politicians the final say. In fact, concerns about public
incompetence no longer influence citizens’ attitudes to-
wards participatory reforms when the decisions are ad-
visory. Legislatures could address concerns about pub-
lic incompetence and minority rights by using advisory
referendums for issues that are either too technical or
highly divisive. The finding that concerns about minority
rights apply to talk-centric instruments as well is poten-
tially troubling for theorists who claim that deliberation
provides a platform forminority perspectives to be heard
(Mendelberg, 2002). Respondents may fear that public
meetings are overshadowed by the loudest voices.
Turning to the limitations of our study, the sample is
not representative which means that the absolute levels
of support for participatory reforms and themain effects
of respondent characteristics should be interpreted with
caution. However, our hypotheses are largely about ef-
fects of the experimental factors and how these differ
between respondent groups, for which sufficient varia-
tion in the respondent characteristics matters more than
a representative sample. Even so, the results raise impor-
tant questions about the extent to which direct and de-
liberative decision-making instruments are welcomed by
ordinary citizens and warrant further investigation on a
representative sample.
On one hand, the vignette text could be expanded
to provide more details about a deliberative meeting.
On the other hand, the task of reading and comparing
the two vignettes is cognitively demanding, especially in
comparison to standard survey items. Therefore, a more
detailed description would make the experiment even
more challenging for respondents, especially those with
lower levels of schooling. A qualitative pilot among a con-
venience sample of students revealed that vignetteswith
more factors were difficult to rate. The complexity of the
vignettes might explain some of the small effect sizes.
Perhaps a larger sample sizewould have resulted inmore
significant interactions, as some relatively large interac-
tion effects had p-values between 0.05 and 0.10. Despite
the complexity of the vignettes, the factors did produce
effects, suggesting that citizens can have opinions about
more complicated political questions and that factorial
survey experiments can be a useful method for studying
political norms and attitudes.
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Appendix
Table 1. Distribution of age and education groups.








High School or more 88.40 99.79
Vocational Certificate or more 58.90 65.41
Associate Degree or more 42.30 57.08
Bachelor’s Degree or more 32.50 37.60





Sources: Data on age and education were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey 2016. Data on party affili-
ation were obtained from a Gallup survey conducted during the same period as our survey (December 2016).
Table 2. Multilevel regression estimates of support for vote-centric and talk-centric instruments (on split samples of
vignettes).
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Sub-Sample of Vignettes Vote-Centric Talk-Centric
Vignette Characteristic
Advisory = 1 (Binding = 0) 0.041(0.17) 0.599(0.18)***
Respondent Characteristics
Residing in R&I State −0.138(0.18) −0.171(0.21)
Public Incompetence −0.110(0.09) −0.256(0.09)**




Political Interest 0.073(0.12) −0.045(0.14)
Education
—Middle-High School (ref) (ref)
— Vocational or Associate’s −0.104(0.23) 0.144(0.26)






Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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